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Abstract
It is argued on the basis of certain mathematical characteristics that
classical mechanics is not constitutionally suited to accomodate conscious-
ness, whereas quantum mechanics is. These mathematical characteristics
pertain to the nature of the information represented in the state of the
brain, and the way this information enters into the dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Classical mechanics arose from the banishment of consciousness from our
conception of the physical universe. Hence it should not be surprising to find
that the readmission of consciousness requires going beyond that theory.
The exclusion of consciousness from the material universe was a hallmark
of science for over two centuries. However, the shift, in the 1920’s, from classical
mechanics to quantum mechanics marked a break with that long tradition: it ap-
peared that the only coherent way to incorporate quantum phenomena into the
existing science was to admit also the human observer.(1) Although the orthodox
approach of Bohr and the Copenhagen school was epistemological rather than
ontological, focussing upon “our knowledge” rather than on any effort to intro-
duce consciousness directly into the dynamics, other thinkers such as John von
Neumann(2), Norbert Weiner(3), and J.B.S. Haldane(4) were quick to point out
that the quantum mechanical aspects of nature seemed tailor-made for bringing
consciousness back into our conception of matter.
This suggestion lay fallow for half a century. But the recent resurgence of
interest in the foundations of quantum theory has led increasingly to a focus on
the crux of the problem, namely the need to understand the role of conscious-
ness in the unfolding of physical reality. It has become clear that the revolution
in our conception of matter wrought by quantum theory has completely altered
the complexion of problem of the relationship between mind and matter. Some
aspects of this change were discussed already in my recent book(5). Here I in-
tend to describe in more detail the basic differences between classical mechanics
and quantum mechanics in the context of the problem of integrating conscious-
ness into our scientific conception of matter, and to argue that certain logical
deficiencies in classical mechanics, as a foundation for a coherent theory of the
mind/brain, are overcome in a natural and satisfactory way by replacing the
classical conception of matter by a quantum conception. Instead of reconciling
the disparities between mind and matter by replacing contemporary (folk) psy-
chology by some yet-to-be-discovered future psychology, as has been suggested
by the Churchlands, it seems enough to replace classical (folk) mechanics, which
is known to be unable to account for the basic physical and chemical process
that underlie brain processes, by quantum mechanics, which does adequately
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describe these processes.
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2. Thoughts within the Classical Framework.
Thoughts are fleeting things, and our introspections concerning them are
certainly fallible. Yet each one seems to have several components bound together
by certain relationships. These components appear, on the basis of psycho-
neurological data(6), to be associated with neurological activities occurring in
different locations in the brain. Hence the question arises: How can neural ac-
tivities in different locations in the brain be components of a single psychological
entity?
The fundamental principle in classical mechanics is that any physical system
can be decomposed into a collection of simple independent local elements each
of which interacts only with its immediate neighbors. To formalize this idea let
us consider a computer model of the brain. According to the ideas of classical
physics it should be possible to simulate brain processes by a massive system
of parallel computers, one for each point in a fine grid of spacetime points that
cover the brain over some period of time. Each individual computer would
compute and record the values of the components of the electromagnetic and
matter fields at the associated grid point. Each of these computers receives
information only from the computers associated with neighboring grid points in
its nearly immediate past, and forms the linear combinations of values that are
the digital analogs of, say, the first and second derivatives of various field values
in its neighborhood, and hence is able to calculate the values corresponding to
its own grid point. The complete computation starts at an early time and moves
progressively forward in time.
On the basis of this computer model of the evolving brain I shall distinguish
the intrinsic description of this computer/brain from an extrinsic description of
it.
The intrinsic description consists of the collection of facts represented by
the aggregate of the numbers in the various registers of this massive system of
parallel computers: each individual fact represented within the intrinsic descrip-
tion is specified by the numbers in the registers in one of these computers, and
the full description is simply the conglomeration of these individual facts. This
intrinsic description corresponds to the fact that in classical mechanics a com-
plete description of any physical system is supposed to be specified by giving
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the values of the various fields (e.g., the electric field, the magnetic field, etc.)
at each of the relevant spacetime points. Similarly, an intrinsic description of
the contents of a television screen might be specified by giving the color and
intensity values for each of the individual points (pixels) on the screen, with-
out any interpretive information (Its a picture of Winston Churchill!), or any
explicit representation of any relationship that might exist among elements of
the intrinsic description (Pixel 1000 has the same values as pixel 1256!). The
analogous basic classical-physics description of a steam engine would, similarly,
give just the values of the basic fields at each of the relevant spacetime points,
with no notice, or explicit representation, of the fact that the system can also
be conceived of as composed of various functional entities, such as pistons and
drive shafts etc.: the basic or intrinsic description is the description of what the
system is, in terms of its logically independent (according to classical mechan-
ics) local components, not the description of how it might be conceive of by an
interpreter, or how it might be described in terms of large functional entities
constructed out of the ontologically basic local components
I distinguish this intrinsic description from an extrinsic description.
An extrinsic description is a description that could be formed in the mind of
an external observer that is free to survey in unison, and act upon together, all
of the numbers that constitute the intrinsic description, unfettered by the local
rules of operation and storage that limit the activities of the computer/brain.
This external observer is given not only the capacity to “know”, separately, each
of the individual numbers in the intrinsic description; he is given also the ability
to know this collection of numbers as a whole, in the sense that he can have
a single register that specifies the entire collection of numbers that constitutes
the intrinsic description. The entire collection of logically and ontologically in-
dependent elements that constitutes the intrinsic description can be represented
by a single basic entity in the extrinsic description, and be part of the body
of information that this external observer can access directly, without the need
for some compositional process in the computer/brain to bring the information
together from far-apart locations. In general, collections of independent entities
at the level of the intrinsic description can become single entities at the level of
an extrinsic description.
The information that is stored in any one of the simple logically independent
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computers, of which the computer/brain is the simple aggregate, is supposed to
be minimal: it is no more than what is needed to compute the local evolution.
This is the analog of the condition that holds in classical physics. As the size of
the regions into which one divides a physical system tends to zero the dynam-
ically effective information stored in each individual region tends to something
small, namely the values of a few fields and their first few derivatives. And these
few values are treated in a very simple way. Thus if we take the regions of the
computer simulation of the brain that are represented by the individual local
computers to be sufficiently small then the information that resides in any one
of these local computers appears to be much less than information needed to
specify a complex thought, such as the perception of a visual scene: entries from
many logically independent (according to classical physics) computers must be
combined together to give the information contained in an individual thought,
which, however, is a single experiential entity. Thus the thought, considered as
a single whole entity, rather than as a collection of independent entities, belongs
to the extrinsic level of description, not to the intrinsic level of description.
According to classical mechanics, the description of both the state of a phys-
ical system and its dynamics can expressed at the intrinsic level. But then how
does one understand the occurrence of experientially whole thoughts? How do
extrinsic-level actual entities arise from a dynamics that is completely reducible
to an intrinsic-level description?
One possibility is that the intrinsic-level components of a thought are bound
together by some integrative process in the mind of a spirit being, i.e., in the
mind of a “ghost behind the machine”, of an homunculus. This approach shifts
the question to an entirely new realm: in place of the physical brain, about
which we know a great deal, and our thoughts, about which we have some
direct information, one has a new “spirit realm” about which science has little
to say. This approach takes us immediately outside the realm of science, as we
know it today.
Alternatively, there is the functional approach. The brain can probably
be conceived of, in some approximation, in terms of large-scale functional en-
tities that, from a certain global perspective, might seem to be controlling the
activity of this brain. However, in the framework of classical mechanics such
“entities” play no actual role in determining of the course of action taken by the
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computer/brain: this course of action is completely controlled by local entities
and local effects. The apparent efficacy of the large-scale “functional entities”
is basically an illusion, according to the precepts of classical mechanics, or the
dynamics of the computer/brain that simulates it: the dynamical evolution is
completely fixed by local considerations without any reference to such global
entities.
As an example take a belief. Beliefs certainly influence, in some sense, the
activities of the human mind/brain. Hilary Putnam characterized the approach
of modern functionalism as the idea that, for example, a belief can be regarded
as an entry in a “belief register”, or a “belief box”, that feeds control infor-
mation into the computer program that represents the brain process. Such a
belief would presumably correspond, physically, to correlations in brain activi-
ties that extend over a large part of the brain. Thus it would be an example
of a functional entity that a human being might, as a short-hand, imagine to
exist as a single whole entity, but that, according to the precepts of classical
mechanics, is completely analyzable, fundamentally, into a simple aggregate of
elementary and ontologically independent local elements. The notion that such
an extrinsic-level functional entity actually is, fundamentally, anything more
than a simple aggregate of logically independent local elements is contrary to
the precepts of classical mechanics. The grafting of such an actual entity onto
classical mechanics amounts to importing into the theory an appendage that is
unnecessary, nonefficacious, and fundamentally illusory from the perspective of
the dynamical workings of that theory itself.
Since this appendage is causally nonefficacious it has no signature, or sign
of existence, within classical physics. The sole reason for adding it to the theory
is to account for our direct subjective awareness of it. Logically and rationally
it does not fit into the classical theory both because it has no dynamical effects,
beyond those due to its local components alone, and because its existence and
character contravenes the locality principle that constitutes the foundation of
the theory, namely the principle that any physical system is to be conceived of
as fundamentally a conglomerate of simple microscopic elements each of which
interacts only with its immediate neighbors. Neither the character of the basic
description of the brain, within classical mechanics, nor the character of the
classical dynamical laws that supposedly govern the brain, provides any basis
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for considering the brain correlate of a thought to be, at the fundamental as
distinguished from functional level, a single whole entity. One may, of course,
postulate some extra notion of “emergence”. But nature must be able to confer
some kind of beingness beyond what is suggested by the precepts of classical
mechanics in order to elevate the brain correlate of a belief to the status of an
ontological whole.
This problem with ‘beliefs’, and other thoughts, arises from the attempt to
understand the connection of thoughts to brains within the framework of clas-
sical physics. This problem becomes radically transformed, however, once one
accepts that the brain is a physical system. For then, according to the precepts
of modern physics, the brain must in principle be treated as a quantum system.
The classical concepts are known to be grossly inadequate at the fundamental
level, and this fundamental inadequacy of the classical concepts is not confined
to the molecular level: it certainly extends to large (e.g., brain-sized) systems.
Moreover, quantum theory cannot be coherently understood without dealing in
some detail with the problem of the relationship between thoughtlike things and
brainlike things: some sort of nontrivial considerations involving our thoughts
seems essential to a coherent understanding of quantum theory.
In this respect quantum theory is wholly unlike classical physics, in which a
human consciousness is necessarily idealized as a non-participatory observer —
as an entity that can know aspects of the brain without influencing it in any way.
This restriction arises because classical physics is dynamically complete in itself:
it has no capacity to accomodate any efficacious entities not already completely
fixed and specified within its own structure. In quantum theory the situation
is more subtle because our perceptions of physical systems are described in a
classical language that is unable to express, even in a gross or approximate way,
the structural complexity of physical systems, as they are represented within
the theory: there is a fundamental structural mismatch between the quantum
mechanical description of a physical system and our description of our percep-
tions of that system. The existence of this structural mismatch is a basic feature
of quantum theory, and it opens up the interesting possibility of representing
the mind/brain, within contemporary physical theory, as a combination of the
thoughtlike and matterlike aspects of a neutral reality.
One could imagine modifying classical mechanics by appending to it the
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concept of another kind of reality; a reality that would be thoughtlike, in the
sense of being an eventlike grasping of functional entities as wholes. In order to
preserve the laws of classical mechanics this added reality could have no effect
on the evolution of any physical system, and hence would not be (publicly) ob-
servable. Because this new kind of reality could have no physical consequences it
could confer no evolutionary advantage, and hence would have, within the scien-
tific framework, no reason to exist. This sort of addition to classical mechanics
would convert it from a mechanics with a monistic ontology to a mechanics with
a dualistic ontology. Yet this profound shift would have no roots at all in the
classical mechanics onto which it is grafted: it would be a completely ad hoc
move from a monistic mechanics to a dualistic one.
In view of this apparent logical need to move from monistic classical me-
chanics to a dualistic generalization, in order to accomodate mind, it is a striking
fact that physicists have already established that classical mechanics cannot ad-
equately describe the physical and chemical processes that underlie brain action:
quantum mechanics is needed, and this newer theory, interpreted realistically, in
line with the ideas of Heisenberg, already is dualistic. Moreover, the two aspects
of this quantum mechanical reality accord in a perfectly natural way with the
matterlike and thoughtlike aspects of the mind/brain. This realistic interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics was introduced by Heisenberg not to accomodate
mind, but rather to to keep mind out of physics; i.e., to provide a thoroughly
objective account of what is happening in nature, outside human beings, with-
out referring to human observers and their thoughts. Yet when this dualistic
mechanics is applied to a human brain it can account naturally for the thought-
like and matterlike aspects of the mind/brain system. The quantum mechanical
description of the state of the brain is automatically (see below) an extrinsic-
level description, which is the appropriate level for describing brain correlates
of thoughts. Moreover, thoughts can be identified with events that constitute
efficacious choices. They are integral parts of the quantum mechanical process,
rather than appendages introduced ad hoc to accomodate the empirical fact that
thoughts exist. These features are discussed in the following sections.
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3. Thoughts Within the Quantum Framework
Let us consider now how the brain would be simulated by a set of parallel
computers when the brain is treated as a quantum system. To make this descrip-
tion clear to every reader, particularly those with no familiarity with quantum
theory, I shall start again from the classical description, but spell it out in more
detail by using some symbols and numbers.
We introduced a grid of points in the brain. Let these points be represented
by a set of vectors ~xi, where i ranges over the integers from 1 to N . At each
point ~xi there was a set of fields ψj(~xi), where j ranges from 1 to M , and M
is relatively small, say ten. For each of the allowed values of the pair (i, j) the
quantity ψj(~xi) will have (at each fixed time) some value taken from the set of
integers that range from −L to +L, where L is a very large number. There is
also a grid of temporal values tn, with n ranging from 1 to T .
The description of the classical system at any time tn is given, therefore,
by specifying for each value of i in the set {1, 2, ..., N} and each value of j in
the set {1, 2, ...,M} some value of ψj(~xi) in the set {−L, ...,+L}. We would
consequently need, in order to specify this classical system at one time, tn, N×M
“registers” or “boxes”, each of which is able to hold an integer in the range
{−L, ...,+L}.
We now go over to the quantum mechanical description of this same sys-
tem. It is helpful to make the transition in two steps. First we pass to the
classical statistical description of the classical system. This is done by assigning
a probability to each of the possible states of the classical system. The number
of possible states of the classical system (at one time) is (2L + 1)M×N . If the
probability assigned to each of the possible classical systems is one of K possible
values then the statistical description of the classical system at one time requires
(2L+1)M×N registers, each with the capacity to distinguish K different values.
This can be compared to the number of registers that was needed to describe the
classical system at one time, which was M × N registers, each with a capacity
to distinguish (2L+ 1) different values.
If the index m runs over the (2L+ 1)M×N possible classical systems then a
probability Pm is assigned to each value of m, where Pm ≥ 0, and ∑Pm = 1.
The quantum-mechanical description is now obtained by replacing each Pm
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by a complex number:
Pm ⇒ rm(cos θm + i sin θm),
where rm =
√
Pm, θm is an angle, cos θ and sin θ are the cosine and sine func-
tions, and i =
√−1.
This replacement might seem an odd thing to do, but one sees that this de-
scription does somehow combine the particle-like aspect of things with a wavelike
aspect: the probability associated with any specific classical statem is r2m = Pm,
and an increase of θm gives a wave-like oscillation.
I am not trying to explain here how quantum theory works: I am merely de-
scribing the way in which the description of the computer/brain system changes
when one passes from the classical description of it to the quantum description.
For the classical description we needed just M × N registers, but for the
quantum description we need 2× (2L+ 1)M×N registers. Thus the information
contained in the quantum mechanical description is enormously larger. We need
a value of rm, and of θm, for each of the possible states of the entire classical
system, where the specification of the state of the classical system includes,
simultaneously, a value of ψj(~xi) for each allowed combination of values of i and
j. That is, for each conceivable state of the entire classical system one needs
two separate registers.
Consider again a belief. As before, a belief would correspond physically to
some combination of values of the fields at many well-separated field points ~xi.
In the classical computer model of the brain there was no register that repre-
sented, or could represent, such a combination of values, and hence we were led
to bring in an “external knower” to provide an adequate ontological substrate
for the existence of the belief. But in the quantum-mechanical description there
is such a register. Indeed, each of the 2 × (2L + 1)M×N registers in the quan-
tum mechanical description of the computer/brain corresponds to a possible
correlated state of activity of the entire classically-conceived computer/brain.
Consequently, there is no longer any need to bring in an “external observer”:
the quantum system itself has the requisite structural complexity. Moreover,
if we accept von Neumann’s (and Wigners(7)) suggestion that the Heisenberg
quantum jumps occur precisely at the high level of brain activity that corre-
sponds to conscious events then there is an “actual happening” (in a particular
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register, m) that corresponds to the occurrence of the conscious experience of
having an awareness of this belief. This “happening” is the quantum jump that
shifts the value of rm associated with this register m from some value less than
unity to the value unity. This jump constitutes the Heisenberg “actualization” of
the particular brain state that corresponds to this belief. Jumps of this general
kind are not introduced merely to accommodate the empirical fact that thoughts
exist. Instead, they are already an essential feature of the Heisenberg descrip-
tion of nature, which is the most orthodox of the existing quantum mechanical
descriptions of the physical world. Thus in the quantum mechanical description
of the brain no reference is needed to any “ghost behind the machine”: the
quantum description already has within itself a register that corresponds to the
particular state of the entire brain that corresponds to the belief. Moreover, it
already has a dynamical process for representing the “occurrence” of this belief.
This dynamical process, namely the occurrence of the quantum jump (reduction
of wave packet), associates the thought with a choice between alternative clas-
sically describable possibilities, any one of which is allowed to occur, according
to the laws of quantum dynamics. Thus the dynamical correlates of thoughts
are natural parts of the quantum-mechanical description of the brain, and they
play a dynamically efficacious role in the evolution of that physical system.
The essential point, here, is that the quantum description is automati-
cally wholistic, in the sense that its individual registers refer to states of the
entire brain, whereas the individual registers in the classically conceived com-
puter/brain represent only local entities. Moreover, the quantum jump associ-
ated with the thought is a wholistic entity : it actualizes as a unit the state of
the entire brain that is associated with the thought.
The fundamentally wholistic character of the quantum mechanical desrip-
tion nature is perhaps its most basic and pervasive feature. It has been demon-
strated to extend to the macroscopic (hundred centimeter) scale in, for example,
the experiments of Aspect, Grangier, and Roger(8). In view of the fact that the
wholistic character of our thoughts is so antithetical to the principles of classi-
cal physics, it would seem imprudent to ignore the wholistic aspect of matter
that lies at the heart of contemporary physics when trying to grapple with the
problem of the connection of matter to consciousness.
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4. On The Thesis That ‘Mind Is Matter’.
Faced with the centuries-old problem of reconciling the thoughtlike and
matterlike aspects of nature many scientists and philosophers are turning to
the formula: ‘mind is matter’.(9) However, this solution has no content until
one specifies what matter is. The need to define ‘matter’ is highlighted by
the extreme disparity in the conceptions of matter in classical mechanics and
quantum mechanics.
One might try to interpret the ‘matter’ occurring in this formula as the
‘matter’ that occurs in classical physics. But this kind of matter does not exist
in nature. Hence the thesis ‘mind is matter’, with matter defined in this way,
would seem to entail that thoughts do not exist.
The thesis that ‘mind is matter’ has been attacked on the ground that
matter is conceptually unsuited to be identified with mind. The main rebuttal
to this criticism given in ref. 9 is that one does not know what the psychological
theory of the future will be like. Hence it is conceivable that the future theory
of mind may not involve the things such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’ and ‘awareness’ that
we now associate with mind. Consequently, some future theory of mind could
conceivably allow us to understand how two such apparently disparate things as
mind and matter could be the same.
An alternative way to reconcile a theory of mind with the theory of matter is
not through some future conception of our mental life that differs so profoundly
from the present-day one, but rather through the introduction the already ex-
isting modern theory of matter. Let me elaborate.
The main objection to the thesis that mind is matter — as contrasted to
the view that mind and matter are different aspects of a single neutral reality
— is based on the fact that each mind is known to only one brain, whereas each
brain is knowable to many minds. These two aspects of the mind/brain are
different in kind: a mind consists of a sequence of private happenings, whereas a
brain consists of a persisting public structure. A mind/brain has both a private
inner aspect, mind, and a public outer aspect, brain, and these two aspects have
distinctive characteristics.
In the quantum description of nature proposed by Heisenberg reality has,
similarly, two different aspects. The first consists of a set of ‘actual events’:
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these events form a sequence of ‘happenings’, each of which actualizes one of
the possibilities offered by the quantum dynamics . The second consists of a set
of ‘objective tendencies’ for these events to occur: these tendencies are repre-
sented as persisting structures in space and time. If we correlate thoughts with
high-level quantum events in brains, as suggested by von Neumann, Wigner,
and others, then we can construct a theory that is a dual-aspect theory of the
mind/brain, in the sense that it correlates the inner, or mental, aspects of the
mind/brain system with ‘actual events’ in Heisenberg’s picture of nature, and
it identifies the the outer, or material, aspects of the mind/brain with the ‘ob-
jective tendencies’ of Heisenberg’s picture of nature.
This theory might, on the other hand, equally well be construed as a theory
in which ‘mind is matter’, if we accept the criteria for intertheoretic reduction(10)
proposed in reference 9. For this quantum theory of the brain is built directly
upon the concepts of the contemporary theory of matter, and it appears(5) to be
able to explain in terms of the laws of physics the causal connections underlying
human behavior that are usually explained in psychological terms. Yet in this
theory there is no abandonment of the normal psychological conception of our
mental life. It is rather the classical theory of matter that is abandoned. In the
terminology used in reference 9 folk psychology is retained, but folk physics is
replaced by contemporary physics.
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5. Final Remarks
It will be objected that the argument given above is too philosophical; that
the simple empirical fact of the matter is that brains are made out of neurons
and other cells that are well described by classical physics, and hence that there
is simply no need to bring in quantum mechanics.
The same argument could be made for electrical devices by an electrical
engineer, who could argue that wires and generators and antennae etc. can be
well described by classical physics. But this would strip him of an adequate
theoretical understanding of the properties of the materials that he is dealing
with: e.g., with a coherent and adequate theory of the properties of transistors
and conducting media, etc. Of course, one can do a vast amount of electrical
engineering without paying any attention to its quantum theoretical underpin-
nings. Yet the frontier developments in engineering today lean heavily on our
quantum theoretical understanding of the way electrons behave in different sorts
of environments.
In an even much more important way the processes that make brains work
the way they do depend upon the intricate physical and chemical properties of
the materials out of which they are made: brain processes depend in an exquisite
way on atomic and molecular processes that can be adequately understood only
through quantum theory. Of course, it would seem easy to assert that small-scale
processes will be described quantum mechanically, and large-scale processes will
be described classically. But large-scale processes are built up in some sense
from small-scale processes, so there is a problem in showing how to reconcile the
large-scale classical behaviour with the small-scale quantum behaviour. There’s
the rub! For quantum mechanics at the small scale simply does not lead to
classical mechanics at the large scale. That is exactly the problem that has
perplexed quantum physicists from the very beginning. One can introduce, by
hand, some arbitrary dividing line between small scale and large scale, and
decree that, in our preferred theory, the quantum laws will hold for small things
and the classical laws will hold for large things. But the separation is completely
ad hoc: there is no natural way to make this division between small and large
in the brain, which is a tight-knit physical system of interacting levels, and
there is no empirical evidence that supports the notion that any such separation
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exists at any level below that at which consciousness appears: all phenomena
so far investigated can be understood by assuming that quantum theory holds
universally below the level where consciousness enters.
Bohr resolved this problem of reconciling the quantum and classical aspect
of nature by exploiting the fact that the only thing that is known to be classi-
cal is our description of our perceptions of physical objects. Von Neumann and
Wigner cast this key insight into dynamical form by proposing that the quan-
tum/classical divide be made not on the basis of size, but rather on the basis
of the qualitative differences in those aspects of nature that we call mind and
matter. The main thrust of ref. 5 is to show, in greater detail, how this idea can
lead, on the basis of a completely quantum mechanical treatment of our brains,
to a satisfactory understanding of why our perceptions of brains, and of all other
physical objects, can be described in classical terms, even though the brains with
which these perceptions are associated are described in completely quantum
mechanical terms.. Any alternative theoretical description of the mind/brain
system that is consistent and coherent must likewise provide a resolution to
the basic theoretical problem of reconciling the underlying quantum-mechanical
character of our brains with the classical character of our perceptions of them.
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6. Conclusions
Classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, considered as conceivable de-
scriptions of nature, are structurally very different. According to classical me-
chanics, the world is to be conceived of as a simple aggregate of logically inde-
pendent local entities, each of which interacts only with its very close neighbors.
By virtue of these interactions large objects and systems can be formed, and we
can identify various ‘functional entities’ such as pistons and drive shafts, and
vortices and waves. But the precepts of classical physics tell us that whereas
these functional units can be identified by us, and can be helpful in our attempts
to comprehend the behaviour of systems, these units do not thereby acquire any
special or added ontological character: they continue to be simple aggregates of
local entities. No extra quality of beingness is appended to them by virtue of
the fact that they have some special functional quality in some context, or by
virtue of the fact that they define a spacetime region in which certain quantities
such as ‘energy density’ are greater than in surrounding regions. All such ‘func-
tional entities’ are, according to the principles of classical physics, to be regarded
as simply consequences of particular configurations of the local entities: their
functional properties are just ‘consequences’ of the local dynamics; functional
properties do not generate, or cause to come into existence, any extra quality or
kind of beingness not inherent in the concept of a simple aggregate of logically
independent local entities. There is no extra quality of ‘beingness as a whole’ ,
or ‘coming into beingness as a whole’ within the framework of classical physics.
There is, therefore, no place within the conceptual framework provided by clas-
sical physics for the idea that certain patterns of neuronal activity that cover
large parts of the brain, and that have important functional properties, have
any special or added quality of beingness that goes beyond their beingness as a
simple aggregate of local entities. Yet an experienced thought is experienced as
a whole thing. From the point of view of classical physics this requires either
some ‘knower’ that is not part of what is described within classical physics, but
that can ‘know’ as one thing that which is represented within classical physics as
a simple aggregation of simple local entities; or it requires some addition to the
theory that would confer upon certain functional entities some new quality not
specified or represented within classical mechanics. This new quality would be
a quality whereby an aggregate of simple independent local entities that acts as
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a whole (functional) entity, by virtue of the various local interactions described
in the theory, becomes a whole (experiential) entity. There is nothing within
classical physics that provides for two such levels or qualities of existence or
beingness, one pertaining to persisting local entities that evolve according to
local mathematical laws, and one pertaining to sudden comings-into-beingness,
at a different level or quality of existence, of entities that are bonded wholes
whose components are the local entities of the lower-level reality. Yet this is ex-
actly what is provided by quantum mechanics, which thereby provides a logical
framework that is perfectly suited to describe the two intertwined aspects of the
mind/brain system.
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Appendix A. Salient Features of the Quantum Theory of the Mind/Brain
Described in Ref. 5.
1. Facilitation. The excitation of a pattern of neural firings produces
changes in the neurons that have the effect of facilitating subsequent excita-
tions the pattern.
2. Associative Recall. The facilitations mentioned above have the feature
that the excitation of a part of the pattern tends to spread to the whole pattern.
3. Body-World Schema. The physical body of the person and the sur-
rounding world are represented by patterns of neural firings in the brain: these
patterns contain the information about the positioning of the body in its envi-
ronment. Brain processes are able to interpret this information.
4. Body-World-Belief Schema The body-world schema has an extension
that represents beliefs and other idealike structures.
5. Records. The B-W-B Schema are representations that have the proper-
ties required for records: they endure, are copiable, and are combinable11. These
requirements ensure that these representations are engraved in degrees of free-
dom that can be characterized as “classical”. Superpositions of such classically
describable states are generally not classical. This characterization of “classical”
(in terms of durability, copiability, and combinability) does not take one outside
quantum theory: it merely distinguishes certain functionally important kinds of
quantum states from others.
6. Evolution Via the Schoedinger Equation. The alert brain evolves under
the quantum dynamical laws from a state in which one B-W-B schema is excited
to a state in which a quantum superposition of several such states are excited.
That is, the brain evolves from a state in which one B-W-B schema is excited, for
a period of time sufficient to “facilitate” the pattern, into a quantum state that
is a superposition of several “classical branches”, each representing a different
classically describable state of the Body-World-Belief complex.
7. The Quantum Jump. The Heisenberg actual event occurs at the high-
level of brain activity where the different classical branches have separated: this
event actualizes one branch and eradicates the others, in accord with Heisen-
berg’s idea of what happens in a measuring device. The human brain is, in
effect, treated as a quantum measuring device.
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8. Thoughts. The occurrence of the Heisenberg event at this high level,
rather than at some lower level (e.g., when some individual neuron fires) is
in line with Wigner’s suggestion that the reduction of the wave packet occurs
in the brain only at the highest level of processing, where conscious thoughts
enter. The state of the brain collapses to a classical branch that encapsulates
and records the information contained in a classical description of the body-
world-belief complex. It is postulated that this actualizing event at the level of
the wave function is associated with a conscious event that is a mental image of
the information represented by the actualized B-W-B schema.
9. Limitations. The theory describes only those collapses that occur in
the part of the physical world associated with human brains: Whether and
where other events occur is left open. A parsimonious version of the theory in
which the only collapses are those associated with human brains would account
in principle for all human experience: there is no empirical evidence available
today that would demand any other actual events. Such a parsimonious theory
would be excessively anthropocentric. Yet any attempt to go beyond it would
be speculative in the absence of relevant data. In the parsimonious version
every actual event corresponds to a human thought, and every human thought
corresponds to an actual event: the theory is maximally linked to the empirical
facts of human experience.
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Appendix B. Survival Advantage
Contemporary quantum theory does not have any definite rule that specifies
where the collapses occur. The proposal adopted here is designed to produce
a simultaneous resolution of the quantum measurement problem and the mind-
matter problem. Thus the proposal is justified by the fact that it produces
a coherent model of reality that accords with our actual experience. Yet the
deeper question arises: Why should the world be this way, and not some other
way? Why should the collapses be to single high-level classical branches, rather
than to either lower-level states, such as firings of individual neurons, or to
higher-level states that might include, for example, many classical branches.
If we suppose that the determination of where the collapses occur is fixed
not by some a priori principle but by habits that become ingrained into nature,
or by some yet-to-be-discovered characteristic of matter that does not single-out
the classical branches ab initio, then the question arises: Is the placement of the
collapses at high-level classical branches, as specified in our model, favorable to
survival of the organism? If so, then there would be an evolutionary pressure for
the collapse location to migrate, in our species, to this high-level placement. The
fact that the collapses, and hence the accompanying experiences, are classical
and high-level would then be consequences of underlying causes, rather than
being simply an unexplained fact of nature: it would be advantageous to the
survival of the organism to tie whatever fundamental property controls collapses
to the high-level classical states of our model.
In fact, it is evident that placement of the collapses at a lower level would
introduce a disruptive stochastic element into the dynamical development of the
system. Any sort of dynamical process designed to allow the organism to respond
in an optimal way to its environmental situation would have a tendency to be
disrupted by the introduction of stochastically instituted low-level collapses,
which will not always be to states that are strictly orthogonal. Thus there
would be an evolutionary pressure that would tend to push the collapses to
higher levels. On the other hand, this pressure would cease once the highest
possible level of classically specified branches is reached. The reason is that in
order for the organism to learn there must be records of what it has done, and
these records must be able to control future actions. But these properties are
essentially the properties by which we have defined “classical”. Superpositions
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of such classical states have, because of the local character of the interaction
terms in the quantum mechanical laws, no ability to reproduce themselves, or
to control future actions of the organism.11 Thus there should be no migration
of the location of the collapse to levels higher than those specified in our model.
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Appendix C. Many-Worlds Theories.
I have accepted here Heisenberg’s idea that there are real events, that each
one represents a transition from “the possible” to “the actual”, and that the
quantum state can be regarded as a representation of “objective tendencies” for
such events to occur. In fact, it is difficult to ascribe any coherent meaning to
the quantum state in the absence of such events. For there is then nothing in the
theory for the probabilities represented by the wave function to be probabilities
of : What does it mean to say that something happens with probability P if
everything happens?
In our model, if we say that there is no collapse then all the branches
continue to exist: there is no singling out and actualization of one single branch.
Each of the several branches will evolve independently of the others, and hence
it is certainly plausible to say that the different realms of experience that we
would like to associate with the different branches should be independent and
non communicating: the records formed in one branch will control only that one
branch, and have no effect upon the others. But if there is no collapse then it
would seem that each of the corresponding separate branches should occur with
probability unity. Yet that would not yield a match with experience. In order to
get a match with experience we must be able to effectively discard in the limit
of an infinite number of repetitions of an experiment those branches that have
a quantum weight that tends to zero in this limit. That is, quantum states with
tiny quantum weights should occur almost never: they should not occur with
probability unity! So without some added ontological or theoretical structure
the many-worlds (i.e., no-collapse) theories fail to give a sensible account of the
statistical predictions of quantum theory.
Of course, the key question is not whether a certain experience X occurs,
but rather whether my experience will be experience X. However, the idea that
many experiences occur, but that my experience will be only one of them in-
volves some new sort of structure involving “choice” and “my”. It involves a
structure that goes beyond the idea of a quantum state of the world evolving
in accordance with the Schroedinger equation. At that basic quantum level the
various classically describable branches are components that are combined con-
junctively: the universe consists of branch 1 and branch 2 and branch 3 and ...
; not branch 1 or branch 2 or branch 3 or ... . Yet the world must be decom-
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posed in terms of alternative possibilities in order to assign different statistical
weights to the different components: the and composition given by the basic
quantum structure must be converted into an or composition. This restructur-
ing seems to require the introduction of some new sort of beingness: the idea of
a psychological being that splits into alternative branches while the associated
physical body, evolving in accord with the Schroedinger equation, is splitting
into a conjunction of corresponding branches. By an appropriate assignment of
statistical weights to the various alternative psychological branches one could
then explain the statistical predictions of quantum theory, but this would seem
to be an ontological tour de force compared to the simpler Wigner idea, adopted
here, that thoughts correspond to real Heisenberg-type events.
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